last few months, the talk that the ranking of Putin and the Russian government’s full support from the population. Jump Olympic rankings and looks really surprising, given that the previous two and a half year rating hovered near the lowest in the history of Putin’s rule values and no tricks were not given effect – the growth was not.
There is an impression that the annexation Crimean War and in Ukraine – is the main thing, which lacked the Russians. Them, so to speak, a true political credo. Another popular interpretation reduces to the assertion that the Russian public opinion today is fully programmable using the TV when the power including resources, everything was as it should.
Indeed, takeoff rating – not even the most surprising recent sociological data months. What is surprising is that the dynamics of opinions Russians literally changed the trend in all directions. Skepticism towards the government changed its complete justification. People do not just say that improving the situation in the country, they say that the situation is improving in the economy and their financial position, and this is in direct contradiction to the statistics. Finally, perhaps the most surprising: a sharply reduced estimates of corruption. Over recent years, the proportion of those who believed that corruption becomes more stable was 50% versus 9% of those who believed that less. And here in the spring share concern about the growing corruption suddenly fell immediately in one step – by 20 percentage points (note, Putin’s approval rating rose by exactly the same 20 percentage points).
On the one hand, when looking at these data there is a feeling that the TV just moved to the head of the respondents: they respond to all questions “on TV” according to the book. On the other hand, the assumption that public opinion in Russia is fully programmable TV, on reflection, should still be rejected. Why would the government then had to worry so much trouble with the actual defeat of the “United Russia” in the elections in 2011, mass demonstrations, falling ratings, not that convincing victory for Putin, if you can just reprogram people? How to explain quite distinct trend of increasing skepticism in relation to the political system and its specific representatives for 2011-2012.? He that – too programmed?
What respondents answering sociologists largely “gleaming” television, in essence, of course. Media to exist to address sensitive social issues. Under normal circumstances, they broadcast a basic range of competing positions on these issues, and polls allow you to see the level of support for different positions. The median voter does not own worn-out beliefs on the majority of issues discussed – he only joined to some authoritative opinions, which are combination of factors seemed to him more convincing.
However, in a situation where 90% of media resources are monopolized and reflect only one point of view, the case is different. Sociology can not measure support for the different points of view – of the respondents do not have access to them. But public opinion, as shown by sociological data is not dead mask hardens TV. It preserves the dynamism, but the meaning of sociological measurement changes: polls not measure the ratio of the different versions of the responses to a particular question, and the level of confidence in the “right answer”, which is broadcast TV. Measured, in fact, the credibility of the “official view” and the TV as her translator.
Thus in some matters people can maintain a high level of confidence in the TV version, in some – to disperse with it. They are usually more skeptical that are closer to them and more important (income, economy, corruption, the quality of public goods), they are less skeptical to the “official version” – on international issues and abstract themes (the preferred model of development, attitude toward the West, historical estimates ).
In this context, the phenomenon of “switching”, the sudden transformation of public opinion in the spring of 2014 can be described like this. With almost fictional saga of Russian combat in eastern Ukraine with “Bandera fascists” television managed to capture, engage emotionally, as if “glued” to the TV population. What provoked wheel increased confidence “version TV” on all fronts.
However, it is not at all. The specificity of “Putin’s support” in this episode indicates another fact. Today its rating levels reached last three. At the beginning of 2000 on the background of Yeltsin’s departure and the war in Chechnya in December 2003 against the background of Putin’s “war against the oligarchy” and the period from July 2007 to fall 2008 on the background of the exclusive economic success and the war in Georgia . The current episode of mobilization sharply differs from them in one parameter: it is accompanied by high expectations index. Expectations regarding changes in the situation in politics and economy remained at about the very low levels, which were in 2012-2013. This means that the fundamental frustrations on the existing socio-political order remain. They only muted thunder Donetsk cannonades.
So, the current consolidation – consolidation is not so much the “party of power” and “Putin’s party” as the consolidation of the “party of the TV.” And even more precisely – its consolidation around specific projects (mobilization “TV Party” began during the Olympics). But this consolidation, as we have seen, requires not only and not so much on-off “25th frame” or “propaganda machine”, but also the enormous costs and stress on building necessary for this series of scenery in reality. Whether it’s Olympic infrastructure in Sochi or the war in eastern Ukraine.
I do not want to say that support for Putin – a myth. When we talk about politics, we mostly talk about myths and their competition. I want to say that contrary to popular belief the current rise of Putin’s rating and pro-government consolidation testify not about the enormous possibilities of power, but rather on the depletion of these opportunities. Each new round of television consolidation needed to maintain domestic political balances requires a truly great and ever-increasing costs. This time – it’s partly political and economic international isolation of Russia.
This suggests that the full-blown crisis looks today, perhaps even more likely than in 2012 only way to cut through it now not with Bulk Swamp, and Putin himself with his politburo and central telemagami channels. This is bad news. Well, so what are.
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